


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## USAWC KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST 2013-2014

**Strategic Studies Institute  
and  
U.S. Army War College Press**

**ACADEMIC YEAR 2013-14**

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST**

**PART I:  
ARMY PRIORITIES FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS**

**Updated: September 24, 2013**

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

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For over a decade, SSI has published the annual Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) to inform students, faculty, and external research associates of strategic topics requiring research and analysis. Part I of the Academic Year (AY) 2013-14 KSIL, referred to as the Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis (APSA), has been developed by Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and SSI. The APSA will help prioritize strategic research and analysis conducted by USAWC students and faculty, USAWC Fellows, and external researchers, to link their research efforts and results more effectively to HQDA's highest priority topics. To improve the relevance of the research and analysis, topics are directly linked to chiefs or points of contact (POC) within appropriate HQDA divisions or directorates. These POCs will advise researchers as to specific topics and results needed to better shape research, analysis, and results that meet the Army's needs.

NOTE: Topics with (\*\*\*) are priority Chief of Staff of the Army topics.

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## FOREWORD

Today's global environment is the most uncertain the Army has faced in several decades. It is unpredictable and dynamic. We do not know when we will have to deploy Soldiers to fight again; but history tells us that we will. We owe it to them to ensure they have the proper resources to be ready when needed.

Research on the topics contained in this document will assist us in shaping the Army of the future. In 2012, the Army began with an initial vision of this future in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG). The 2013 ASPG refined that vision by incorporating a year's worth of study, analysis, and experience. Through research in the following topics, we will continue to transition to the Army of the future. We organized these topics to support the four imperatives and related objectives discussed in the 2013 ASPG.

We must decide which capabilities and knowledge gained over the past decade-plus of combat we will develop further, which we will maintain, and which we will allow to go dormant. We must decide how to organize, train, and equip our Army efficiently to prepare it for the uncertain global environment ahead of us. To assist in doing so, we publish the Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis (APSA).

The Chief of Staff, Army is keenly interested in each of the topics listed; however, I highlight a subset of these topics at the front of the document, the analysis of which is truly critical to the Army's future success, and I strongly encourage U.S. Army War College students and Fellows to consider those priority issues, as well as others listed in the APSA. The Army needs your study and analysis today more than ever. The APSA also provides fertile ground to be tilled by our external research associates.

Given today's fiscal realities and the dynamic strategic environment, the Army's vision, direction, and objectives must continue to evolve so that we can adapt to global challenges. Through our collective research and analysis efforts, our armed forces will gain strength through wisdom.

ANTHONY A. CUCOLO III  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commandant



## CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY SPECIAL INTEREST TOPICS

1. If we do not plan to engage in “long wars” and we do not plan to “mobilize for the duration,” then how should the Army change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC and how to utilize them? Is the RC too large? Should it be larger? What is the “right mix” of force allocation between the AC and RC? (POC: COL FcVfh< i [ \Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg^i \[ \Yg\\$a \]4a U^a \]](#); 703-693-3240)
2. How important is speed – both in terms of maneuver and information? How would the requirements for the Joint Force change if we changed assumptions about required speed of responsiveness and of campaign conclusion? What does the historical record show about the levels of responsiveness we have actually been able to achieve (and the levels of readiness of the responding force), and how does that compare to how we plan to employ the force? (POC: COL FcVfh< i [ \Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg^i \[ \Yg\\$a \]4a U^a \]](#); 703-693-3240)
3. Re-computing “Tooth to Tail” – Lines between “tooth” and “tail” have blurred in a net-centric environment and in an environment of Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security occurring simultaneously. How do we measure “Tooth to Tail”? How should we measure it (or should we not measure)? How should we best frame the discussion? How can we test for “tooth to tail” sensitivity?” (POC: COL FcVfh< i [ \Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg^i \[ \Yg\\$a \]4a U^a \]](#); 703-693-3240)
4. There currently exists a dangerous gap in the development of Army doctrine in regard to countering potential asymmetric threats. Current doctrinal efforts focus on Phases II and III of the Joint operational planning phases. Propose a strategy for identifying/countering asymmetric threats in Phases 0, I, IV, and V. What are the limits to countering asymmetric threats in these phases? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, [dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil](mailto:dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil), 703-697-4916)
5. How can the Army efficiently increase collaboration with the other services across the DOTMLPF spectrum towards implementation, and further spiral development, of the Joint Operational Access Concept? Which specific Army capabilities should be prioritized for further and more robust multi-service experimentation and wargaming with follow-on integration into joint exercises to implement and enhance the Joint Operational Access Concept and supporting Air-Sea Battle concept? (POC: COL John Goetz, HQDA G-3/5/7, Air/Sea, [john.c.goetz3.mil@mail.mil](mailto:john.c.goetz3.mil@mail.mil), 703-614-9705)
6. Consider the rationale for previous force restructuring. Given the increasing emphasis on budget austerity, do the efficiencies gained in a Divisional force with a DISCOM, DIVARTY, Engineer Brigade, and Intelligence and Signal Battalions outweigh the advantages of a Modular Force Structure? Is the criteria for measuring “efficiencies”

today different than in the past? (POC: COL Mark Berglund, HQDA G-3/5/7, Organizational Integration, [mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil](mailto:mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-7953)

7. Explain the doctrinal and operational relationships between “Building Partner Capacity,” “Security Cooperation,” “Security Assistance,” and “Security Force Assistance.” Describe how the Army currently contributes to each of these, if the contributions are the “right” efforts at the appropriate levels, and ways that the Army can improve on its contributions. (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Strategy and Programs, [mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil](mailto:mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil), 703-692-7807)

8. How can the Army best integrate and synchronize the functions included within what DoD terms countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) across the Army Staff, DOTMLPF, and subordinate commands? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, [juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil](mailto:juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil), 703-806-7852)

9. Given previous work with respect to anti-access/area denial in space and the recent Space CBA, what changes to policy, roles, and missions should the Army consider to assure its space-dependent warfighting functions? What capabilities will the Air Force, Navy, and National Reconnaissance Office develop? Will their capabilities serve Army needs in space? If not, then how should the Army alter its roles and missions in space? (POC: [CH7\\_9X5bXfgeb](mailto:CH7_9X5bXfgeb), HQDA G-3/5/7, Space, [9XkUfX\['bXfgeb' 'a \]'4a U`'a \]](mailto:9XkUfX['bXfgeb' 'a ]'4a U`'a ]), 703-607-588+)

10. Determine COAs to equip the RAF concept:

- Should the Army build TOEs that correspond with RAFs?
- How can/should the Army APS structure best support RAF?
- Should the Army build RAF equipment sets to support rotation of forces?
- How do you support the logistic requirements for this equipment set?

(POC: COL FcVfh< i [ \Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg'i \[ \Yg\\$a \]'4a U`'a \]](mailto:FcVfhg'i [ \Yg$a ]'4a U`'a ]), 703-693-3240)

11. Can the significant amount of vertical lift capability resident in the Army be integrated into emerging Air-Sea battle doctrine? What are the requirements for a CAB to train for sea-based operations, especially in an anti-access/area denial environment? How can Army Aviation complement Marine capabilities in sea-based helicopter operations? (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, [jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil](mailto:jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-1634)

12. Given the rise of small UAS, especially those at the platoon level, how might the area of operations of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) change? How might such a change impact the overall force structure of the Army? How have previous technological advancements impacted force structures in the past? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G-3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems, [james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil](mailto:james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil), 703-693-3552)



**PART I:  
ARMY PRIORITIES FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS**

**ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE:  
ARMY IMPERATIVES**

1. Provide Modernized and Ready, Tailored Land Force Capabilities to meet combatant commanders' requirements across the range of military operations.

**Near-Term Objectives:**

a. *Train for Operational Adaptability*

1) Evaluate current and previous efforts of Security Sector Reform/Defense Sector Reform (SSR/DSR) as conducted through the Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD), and international partners. Assess where positive and negative outcomes have occurred. Drawing on such findings, recommend a potential model or framework through which the Army could improve support to SSR/DSR. (Point of Contact (POC): Ms. Rachel Smith, Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) G-3/5/7, International Affairs, [rachel.m.smith.civ@mail.mil](mailto:rachel.m.smith.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-9587)

2) What are the key skills and attributes the Army must sustain to retain the capability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, and how will the Army develop and sustain those skills and attributes? Civil Affairs? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQ G-8, QDR, [timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil](mailto:timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-5591)

3) \*\*\*Can the significant amount of vertical lift capability resident in the Army be integrated into emerging Air-Sea battle doctrine? What are the requirements for a combat aviation brigade (CAB) to train for sea-based operations, especially in an anti-access/area denial environment? How can Army Aviation complement Marine capabilities in sea-based helicopter operations? (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, [jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil](mailto:jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-1634)

b. *Continue to Increase the Integration between Conventional Forces and Special Forces*

4) In order to positively shape the operational environment for unified action, the Army must effectively employ strategic Landpower. Historically, Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) have focused efforts on human interaction. Army Conventional Forces (CF) have specialized in combined arms maneuver with less regard for the impact of human interaction. Given the current level of uncertainty in the strategic environment along with the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept, analyze how SOF and CF might become more interdependent across each operation plan phase, and describe some ways and means through which SOF and CF can efficiently increase

their capabilities through interdependent actions. (POC: COL K J`JL` 7Ufmi", HQDA G-3/5/7, Special Operations Division, [k j`JL` "Wfma J`4a U`a J`](#), 703-695-8490)

c. *Integrate Lessons Learned and Capabilities Gained in Recent Operations*

5) During the past decade-plus of conflict, the U.S. Army has faced numerous types of asymmetric threats from adversaries seeking to evade U.S. Army overmatch capabilities on the battlefield. The Army responded by developing rapid and adaptive processes to counter and defeat these new threats. However, with the coming reduction of Army personnel and funding, there is significant risk of the erosion of the capabilities and knowledge gained over the course of these operations. How can the Army best institutionalize the lessons learned over the past decade, or should the Army make the deliberate decision to relearn these capabilities in future conflict? Should the Army adjust its policies and procedures in response to the last conflict or deliberately decide to allow future Army leaders to innovate to solve their specific problems of the day? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, [dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil](mailto:dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil), 703-697-4916)

6) Based upon the experiences of the past decade of conflict, especially in regard to Army and DoD efforts to counter the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, should the Army institutionalize a Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)-like organizational ability to identify and address future asymmetric threats as they emerge? If so, what capabilities and resources would such an organization require, and where should it reside? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, [dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil](mailto:dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil), 703-697-4916)

7) After the United States departs Afghanistan, opportunities to gain experience in coalition missions may be limited. How valuable is coalition experience to the U.S. Army? How can the Army sustain the knowledge gained through the coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan? (POC: COL Thomas Moffatt, HQDA G-3/5/7, Military Observers Group, [thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil](mailto:thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil), 703-545-7150)

d. *Continue to Maintain a Global Stabilizing Presence*

8) How does U.S. Army support for international/United Nations (UN) operations enhance U.S. national security? The policy governing command and control of individual soldiers assigned to international and UN operations is over 40 years old. How should the U.S. Army conduct command and control of these personnel? (POC: COL Thomas Moffatt, HQDA G-3/5/7, Military Observers Group, [thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil](mailto:thomas.j.moffatt.mil@mail.mil), 703-545-7150)

9) How do we institutionalize lessons learned in building partner capacity since September 11, 2001 (9-11) and then apply them as we go forward?

10) Due to the increased emphasis on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC), how can we develop metrics and a net assessment to determine that shaping and engagement actions work? Develop recommendations to measure and assess these actions and prioritize where the Army needs to focus its efforts?

11) How much can we increase our reliance on new and traditional friends and allies? How do we encourage our friends and partners to carry a larger (more proportionate?) share of the international security responsibility? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, [timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil](mailto:timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-5591)

e. *Adapt the Army Force Generation Model*

12) Should the Army continue to utilize the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) as a core process versus its use of a temporary wartime procedure? How does the Army's Title 10 requirement to generate forces change based on conditions and demand? (POC: COL Todd Key, HQDA G-3/5/7, War Plans, [todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil](mailto:todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil), 703-697-7458)

f. *Regionally Align Forces*

13) \*\*\*Determine courses of action (COAs) to equip the RAF concept:

- Should the Army build Table of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) that correspond with RAFs?
- How can/should the Army Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) structure best support RAF?
- Should the Army build RAF equipment sets to support rotation of forces?
- How do you support the logistic requirements for this equipment set?

(POC: COL FcVfh< i [ \Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg"i \[ \Yg\\$a \] 4a U" a \]](mailto:FcVfhg), 703-693-3240)

14) As the Army moves towards implementation of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, what is the best way to implement Army Aviation within RAF? An aviation task force to support a RAF may have to operate in multiple types of environments. How does this potential impact Army Aviation's ability to adequately support RAF? Are environmentally qualified Aviation units more effective than regionally-aligned units? (POC: LTC David George, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation-Current Operations, [david.a.george.mil@mail.mil](mailto:david.a.george.mil@mail.mil), 703-695-0209)

15) Due to the increase in the operating tempo (OPTEMPO), reduced resources and efforts of the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the recently released DoD Initiative (DoDI) 5111.20, assess the feasibility to incorporate the State Partnership

Program as integral to the RAF. ([www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511120p.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511120p.pdf), State Partnership Program).  
(COL Lorelei Coplen, USAWC, PKSOI, [Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil](mailto:Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil), 717-245-3740)

16) How can the RAF concept be implemented to benefit the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Alliance? Moreover, what is the optimal role of the RAF? (POC: MAJ Matthew Yiengst, Eighth U.S. Army, Strategic Planner, [matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil](mailto:matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil))

*g. Institute Army Total Force Policy*

17) The Militia System and the Creighton Abrams experiment may have run their course. Should the Army rethink force mix and component roles? Part of this may include focusing the ARNG on homeland defense as part of the Department of Homeland Security. What other important Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) mix issues should be examined as the Army draws down. (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HDAQ G-8, QDR, [timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil](mailto:timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-5591)

18) Due to the increasing tempo of operations and need for responsiveness, is it time to reexamine the “Abrams doctrine” and look at the possibility of going to war without the RC and operate for a period of time solely with the AC? Does deploying the RC really influence public support?

*h. Set Theaters via Capable Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and Theater Support Forces*

19) \*\*\*Explain the doctrinal and operational relationships between “Building Partner Capacity,” “Security Cooperation,” “Security Assistance,” and “Security Force Assistance.” Describe how the Army currently contributes to each of these, if the contributions are the “right” efforts at the appropriate levels, and ways that the Army can improve on its contributions. (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Strategy and Programs, [mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil](mailto:mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil), 703-692-7807)

20) What should the roles and missions of corps and ASCCs be? Are they duplicative? (Dr. John Bonin, USAWC, CSLD, [john.a.bonin.civ@mail.mil](mailto:john.a.bonin.civ@mail.mil), 717-245-3457)

21) The U.S. Army cannot prevent and shape conflict everywhere. Within each geographic combatant command, where are the key places the Army needs to engage in order to best support U.S. national security objectives? What advice should the Army provide to civil leadership on the engagement-risk tradeoff? (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, [francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil](mailto:francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-9450)

22) How can Army Air and Missile Defense improve the balance between Army, Joint and Combatant Command (COCOM) priorities in a fiscally constrained

environment? (POC: LTC Kurt Johnson, HQDA G-3/5/7, Air and Missile Defense, [kurt.w.johnson6.mil@mail.mil](mailto:kurt.w.johnson6.mil@mail.mil), 703-607-1203)

23) What is the Army role in supporting evolving U.S. policy towards Africa (post Libya, Mali, Algeria, etc.) and possible expansion of U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) role in helping secure/promote U.S. interests on the continent?

24) The Security Cooperation mission crosses over agency boundaries—principally a State department lead, with military support, dominated by Foreign Military Sales (FMS). What are the missions, roles, and responsibilities of the various stakeholders? There are numerous stakeholders within the Army who conduct security cooperation activities. Is there a need to have a single Army proponent for Army security cooperation to better synchronize holistic security cooperation efforts (to include security assistance) in order to support Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) end states? (POC: Mr. Mark McDonough, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Strategy and Programs, [mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil](mailto:mark.e.mcdonough4.civ@mail.mil), 703-692-7807)

25) What are the long term benefits and risks of land forces on Korea, in North East Asia, in the Asia-Pacific region? (POC: MAJ Matthew Yiengst, Eighth U.S. Army, Strategic Planner, [matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil](mailto:matthew.c.yiengst.mil@mail.mil))

26) Interoperability is often cited as a key way to enhance the benefits and effectiveness of multinational operations. Even after over a decade of coalition operations, there is a lack of cohesion in efforts to increase interoperability between the United States and its allies and partners. Discuss what interoperability is and its components and what it means to a participating nation. Describe a potential overarching interoperability policy that accounts for minimum standards for interoperability, that sets criteria for countries with which the United States should be interoperable, and recommends means, methods and/or processes (existing or needed) to achieve such interoperability and increase coherency of efforts. (POC: Ms. Alicia Weed, HQDA G-3/5/7, Multinational Programs, [alicia.g.weed.civ@mail.mil](mailto:alicia.g.weed.civ@mail.mil), 703-693-1989)

i. *Provide Ready and Trained Forces for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Forces for Operations in the Homeland*

27) \*\*\*How can the Army best integrate and synchronize the functions included within what DoD terms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) across the Army Staff, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), and subordinate commands? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, [juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil](mailto:juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil), 703-806-7852)



28) Many active CBRN forces are on orders/Prepare To Deploy Orders (PTDO) to support Homeland Defense missions. Given the magnitude of this mission, they are considered unavailable for overseas contingency missions. Assess if the active force requirements to support potential Homeland Defense and Domestic Response missions are adequate. Are these active CBRN forces able to meet future overseas contingency operations given the domestic requirements? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, [juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil](mailto:juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil), 703-806-7852)

29) Army General Purpose Forces (GPF) are a critical for the success of the Joint Force Counter-WMD operations. Is the current Brigade Combat Team (BCT)-organized force more effective than the Division-based force for supporting Joint Forces CWMD operations as the major component (and lead) for Unified Land Operations? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, [juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil](mailto:juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil), 703-806-7852)

30) Joint and Army strategic planning guidance documents clearly identify Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) as a means to train foreign forces to support regional coalitions. Likewise, disaster relief and consequence management forces that are regionally-based can offer a quicker response to a disaster/humanitarian incident. How could U.S. Consequence Management/CBRN forces be employed to train regional forces in this technical mission? What are the costs and requirements to initiate such a BPC program? (POC: COL Juan Cuadrado, HQDA G-3/5/7, USANCA, [juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil](mailto:juan.a.cuadrado.mil@mail.mil), 703-806-7852)

j. *Balance Active and Reserve Component Force Readiness*

31) \*\*\*If we do not plan to engage in "long wars," and we do not plan to "mobilize for the duration," then how should the Army change the way it thinks about the roles of the RC and how to utilize them? Is the RC too large? Should it be larger? What is the "right mix" of force allocation between the AC and RC? (POC: COL FcVfh < i [ \Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg"i \[ \Yg\\$a \] 4a U"a \]](mailto:FcVfhg), 703-693-3240)

32) What is the Army's responsibility to provide a strategic reserve? In the context of the on-going drawdown, what is the capacity of the Army to provide a strategic reserve? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, [timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil](mailto:timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-5591)

33) Sustaining the aviation fleet remains a top priority for the Army. The OPTEMPO and resources of the past decade have permitted high states of readiness and maintenance. Given the impact of budget constraints on aviation readiness, how must sustainment evolve in order to ensure the health of the fleet? Describe some ways to properly incentivize more efficient sustainment of Army aircraft. (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, [jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil](mailto:jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-1634)



34) What is the appropriate composition of aviation assets across the AC, the RC, and National Guard (NG)? For example, does the NG have a requirement for AH-64s and/or does it make more sense that greater lift capability reside in the RC? (POC: COL Vincent Torza, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation Systems, [jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil](mailto:jvincent.h.torza.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-1634)

35) Section 12304a of Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense authority to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the army Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days to provide assistance in response to a major disaster or emergency. Discuss the various issues at stake when USAR elements are mobilized to conduct homeland support operations. Develop a potential strategy through which the Army can efficiently execute such an order. (POC: LTC Deborah Scott, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, [deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil](mailto:deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil), 703-693-8982)

36) Section 12304b of Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense authority to order any unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in Title 10, Section 10143a) to active duty for not more than 365 consecutive days to augment the active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command. Discuss the various issues at stake when USAR elements are mobilized to augment a combatant command. Develop a potential strategy through which the Army can efficiently execute such an order. (POC: LTC Deborah Scott, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, [deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil](mailto:deborah.s.scott2.mil@mail.mil), 703-693-8982)

37) Trace the series of presidential executive orders that have mobilized the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to active duty from Operation DESERT STORM through the present day. Considering this history as well as the missions conducted by the Ready Reserve beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, outline a potential strategy for the future of U.S. AR and NG mobilization. What is the value of the Ready Reserve as an operational force? What is the value of the Ready Reserve as a strategic reserve? Recommend ways in which the Army can leverage the RC to balance the concepts of scalability and responsiveness in the future. (POC: LTC Clayton Gardner, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, [clayton.e.gardner.mil@mail.mil](mailto:clayton.e.gardner.mil@mail.mil), 703-697-2002)

### **Mid-Term Objectives:**

#### *k. Modernize Equipment to Prepare for Future Challenges*

38) The new Defense Guidance directs a transition from a narrow to a broader focus for the Army as it prepares for future potential conflicts and adversaries represented by a complex and interconnected global operational environment, as articulated in the Army's Equipment Modernization Strategy. Considering the expected

likely future strategic environment how should the Army balance force protection, mobility and fire power in its vehicle fleet? As part of this consideration, what is the future role of the two variants of Stryker-equipped brigades? Also, what are the advantages and disadvantages of a Bradley-based replacement for the M113 family? (POC: COL Richard Holdren, HQDA G-3/5/7, Experimentation and Testing, [richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil](mailto:richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil), 703-545-4363)

1. *Increase the Combat Power of Army Formations*

39) \*\*\*Given the rise of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), especially those at the platoon level, how might the area of operations of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) change? How might such a change impact the overall force structure of the Army? How have previous technological advancements impacted force structures in the past? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G-3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems, [james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil](mailto:james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil), 703-693-3552)

40) Consider the current measures of Army readiness. What are the relationships between readiness, capacity, and capability? How can readiness measures evolve to increase their value to the commander with respect to a unit's mission set? (POC: [@H7fDLFcB@\\_ck](mailto:@H7fDLFcB@_ck), HQDA G-3/5/7, C8F, [fcBUX@\\_ck](mailto:fcBUX@_ck), 703-697-%, ' )

41) What are the implications of current technology on the Army's BCT structure? What are the dimensions of battle space that a modern BCT covers? Do these dimensions differ significantly across the potential operational environments? Recommend a new force structure that leverages scalability and responsiveness to contingencies. (POC: COL Richard Holdren, HQDA G-3/5/7, Experimentation and Testing, [richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil](mailto:richard.j.holdren.mil@mail.mil), 703-545-4363)

m. *Ensure that Forces are capable of Joint Entry Operations*

42) Evaluate the tradeoffs of power projection, prepositioning, and forward stationing.

43) What role do ground forces play in defeating an adversary's anti-access/area-denial strategies?

44) Given previous work with respect to anti-access/area denial in space—Tactical Space Protection Study, National Security Strategy for Space, National Military Strategy for Space Operations, DoD Definition for Space Resilience—and the Joint Operational Access Concept, what might be the best way for the Army to assure its space-dependent warfighting functions in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment where space systems are degraded for substantial periods of time? How

could the Army reduce the degree and/or duration of degradation through implementation of various alternate space and nonspace means? Some examples of such mitigation include the deployment/employment of tactical satellite constellations, use of high-altitude long-loiter orbits, and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)/UASs. (POC: [@H7.....9X.....5bXYfgcb](#) HQDA G-3/5/7, Space, [9XkUfX\["UbXfgcb" "a \]`4a U`"a \]](#), 703-607-588+)

n. *Protect Friendly Mission Command Systems and Impede Enemy Information*

45) The relationship between Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare is described as one of convergence, but in reality the two are, and should remain, inextricably linked but separate. Understanding the relationship between Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare is essential to sufficiently exploit opportunities and defend vulnerabilities within these related areas. Analyze the symbiotic nature of their relationship, articulate the separation and the similarities of the two, and describe the impact of conducting Cyber Operations and Electronic Warfare to achieve national security objectives. (POC: COL Charles Ekvall, HQDA G-3/5/7, Electronic Warfare, [charles.j.ekvall.mil@mail.mil](mailto:charles.j.ekvall.mil@mail.mil), 703-614-6795)

46) The recent establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) directs the Commander to also serve as Director, National Security Agency, leaning toward an intelligence-centric mission. Yet, the associated Service Cyberspace mission is to build, operate, and defend the network which is primarily a communication-centric mission. Given USCYBERCOM's mission to direct operations, defend networks, and, on order, conduct full spectrum operations, has DoD appropriately framed the command and control of military cyberspace forces? (POC: COL Carmine Cicalese, HQDA G-3/5/7, Cyber/Information Operations, [carmine.cicalese.mil@mail.mil](mailto:carmine.cicalese.mil@mail.mil), 703-695-1864)

**Long-Term Objectives:**

o. *Develop the Plan for Mission Tailored Force Packages*

47) The Defense Strategic Guidance from January 2012, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, states that "Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region." For Army forces, develop a definition of "denying the objectives of . . ." and consider how the Army might contribute to such a "deny" mission. (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, [francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil](mailto:francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-9450)

48) The Defense Strategic Guidance from January 2012, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*, states that "Whenever possible, we will develop

*innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” For Army forces, define “low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” and suggest how the Army might contribute to such an approach. (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, [francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil](mailto:francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-9450)*

## **2. Develop Leaders To Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century**

### **Near-Term Objectives:**

#### *p. Train, Educate and Provide Leaders with Experience*

49) How can the Army prepare, train, and retain officers with the necessary multifaceted experience to take on a broad range of missions and roles? What is the best way to prepare officers to succeed in a world of change, complexity, and uncertainty?

50) Should Department of the Army civilians be developed just as officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)? If so, how should that be done?

51) Why is Army representation in key joint billets lower than the other services?

52) Analyze the effectiveness of the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) in setting the conditions for, and developing Soldiers capable of leading a diverse military and civilian workforce in a precarious resource environment and who constantly adapt to meet future security challenges in an increasingly uncertain, complex, and interconnected global environment. What are the measures of effectiveness for the Army Leader Development Strategy and how will the Army know that implementation is fully realized, successful, and effective? Ensure the analysis builds on the 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Leader Development Task Force (LDTF) Study and Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Leadership (CASAL) feedback. Analysis should include perspectives on "developing others" and "transforming personnel processes," (specifically "talent management"). POC: Ms. Terri Ashley, HQDA G-3/5/7, Training Directorate, [terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil](mailto:terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil), 703-692-7779.

53) Describe what goals, objectives, measures, and management plan the Army can use to best ensure the principles of Mission Command are embedded in leader development. Offer recommendations to more widely communicate Mission Command to all cohorts (Army Civilian, Non-commissioned Officer, Warrant Officer, and Officer). POC: Ms. Terri Ashley, HQDA G-3/5/7, Training Directorate, [terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil](mailto:terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil), 703-692-7779.

#### *q. Enhance Broadening Opportunities*

*r. Reinforce the Army Profession in the 21st Century*

54) The Army Profession emerged from a year-long introspective examination of how more than a decade of war have affected the Army as an institution and what it means to be a member of the Army Profession. In addition to efforts such as the Army Profession Campaign and the "America's Army" - Our Profession, CY13 Training and Education Program, how can the Army most effectively foster continued commitment to the Army Profession? Offer recommendations to more widely instill and communicate the Army Profession to all cohorts (Army Civilian, Non-commissioned Officer, Warrant Officer, and Officer). POC: Ms. Terri Ashley, HQDA G-3/5/7, Training Directorate, [terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil](mailto:terri.l.ashley.civ@mail.mil), 703-692-7779.

55) Honoring Public Trust: The Army Profession and Ethic -- Evaluate Army Profession Doctrine and the Army Ethic as the basis for internal and external trust relationships. What are the measures of effectiveness for how well the Army Profession Doctrine is practiced, understood, embodied by all cohorts? Is the internal trust relationships different than the external trust relationships, if so, what are some possible reasons? Ideas for improving trust within and outside the Army. POC Mr. Chris Rizzo, HQDA G-3/5/7, Training Directorate, [Christopher.j.rizzo.civ@mail.mil](mailto:Christopher.j.rizzo.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-9734.

56) Professional Dissonance: Tensions between Culture and Institution -- Analyze tensions between Army culture and institutional requirements and evaluate the effect of the Army Culture as it pertains to institutional requirements. How do the Army's talent management processes affect this tension? How are meeting institutional requirements viewed by the Army Profession? POC Mr. Chris Rizzo, HQDA G-3/5/7, Training Directorate, [Christopher.j.rizzo.civ@mail.mil](mailto:Christopher.j.rizzo.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-9734.

**Mid-Term Objectives:**

*s. Develop Leaders Who are Proficient in Cyberspace and Enhance Our Cyber Professional Workforce*

57) How do we assess, develop, and employ leaders for cyber warfare? (POC: COL Carmine Cicalese, HQDA G-3/5/7, Cyber/Information Operations, [carmine.cicalese.mil@mail.mil](mailto:carmine.cicalese.mil@mail.mil), 703-695-1864)

**3. Adapt the Army to More Effectively Provide Land Power**

**Near-Term Objectives:**

t. *Reform and Restructure the Institutional Army*

58) As the Army returns its institutional focus to combined arms maneuver, what organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations stemming from a decade of counterinsurgency could contribute to success in conventional warfare? What should we preserve? (POC: COL Todd Key, HQDA G-3/5/7, War Plans, [todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil](mailto:todd.e.key.mil@mail.mil), 703-697-7458)

59) How does the phrase Irregular Warfare (IW) help DoD understand and solve military or security challenges? Are the current definitions appropriate, and necessary? How does that definition incorporate or explain IW's relationship with Stability? With COIN? (COL Lorelei Coplen, USAWC, PKSOI, [Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil](mailto:Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil), 717-245-3740)

60) Should COIN include Stability tasks as critical components or should COIN be better described as an activity to conduct within a Stability operation? (COL Lorelei Coplen, USAWC, PKSOI, [Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil](mailto:Lorelei.e.coplen.mil@mail.mil), 717-245-3740)

u. *Reset the Force*

61) \*\*\*Consider the rationale for previous force restructuring. Given the increasing emphasis on budget austerity, do the efficiencies gained in a Divisional force with a Division Support Command, Division Artillery (DISCOM, DIVARTY), Engineer Brigade, and Intelligence and Signal Battalions outweigh the advantages of a Modular Force Structure? Is the criteria for measuring "efficiencies" today different than in the past? (POC: COL Mark Berglund, HQDA G-3/5/7, Organizational Integration, [mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil](mailto:mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-7953)

62) Personnel availability tends to challenge the Army much more than it does the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Describe the Army's ability to absorb its "unavailable" personnel. Examine the current facts, analyze the consequences of those facts, and recommend ways to mitigate the impact of the Army's unavailable personnel. (POC: @H7fDL Fcb @i\_ck, HQDA G-3/5/7, C8F, [fcuX@i\\_ck@a4aU@a](mailto:fcuX@i_ck@a4aU@a), 703-697-4, ')

63) Evaluate the current Army readiness reporting structure:

- Do current Army readiness reporting requirements provide a portrayal of unit readiness measured during specific moments in time/ARFORGEN Cycle?
- Should the Army report unit readiness against current/future ARFORGEN aim points?
- Evaluate if "requirement equals authorizations" remains viable in an era of declining resourcing.



(POC: COL FcVfh< i [\Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg\i \[\Yg\\$a \]4a U`a \]](#), 703-693-3240)

64) Is the Army over-structured in its Grade Plate? Do we need the Leader-Led ratio we have today because of operational changes or because of grade inflation (compensation/retention policies)? How do we define requirements-by-grade and do we do it well/correctly? How could we do it differently and should we? (POC: COL FcVfh< i [\Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg\i \[\Yg\\$a \]4a U`a \]](#), 703-693-3240)

65) What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade vs. Chemical, Engineer and Military Police Functional Brigades? Is there a place in the Army's Force Structure for both? If the number of headquarters and size of headquarters remain a challenge based on end strength reductions, which should remain in the force? (POC: COL Mark Berglund, HQDA G-3/5/7, Organizational Integration, [mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil](mailto:mark.j.berglund.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-7953)

#### **Mid-Term Objectives:**

##### *v. Continue to Modernize Business Operations*

66) \*\*\*Re-computing "Tooth to Tail" – Lines between "tooth" and "tail" have blurred in a net-centric environment and in an environment of Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security occurring simultaneously. How do we measure "Tooth to Tail?" How should we measure it (or should we not measure)? How should we best frame the discussion? How can we test for "tooth to tail" sensitivity?" (POC: COL FcVfh< i [\Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfhg\i \[\Yg\\$a \]4a U`a \]](#), 703-693-3240)

##### *w. Rebalance the Generating Force*

67) Expansibility and reversibility: How should the Army (Operational and Generating Force) organize to ensure it is expansible should it need to grow to meet demand in time of conflict? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, [timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil](mailto:timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-5591)

##### *x. Set Conditions to Expand the Army When Called Upon*

68) \*\*\*How important is speed – both in terms of maneuver and information? How would the requirements for the Joint Force change if we changed assumptions about required speed of responsiveness and of campaign conclusion? What does the historical record show about the levels of responsiveness we have actually been able to achieve (and the levels of readiness of the responding force), and how does that

compare to how we plan to employ the force? (POC: COL FcVfHg^i [\Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfHg^i \[\Yg\\$^a \]`4a U`a \]](#), 703-693-3240)

69) The American way of war typically expands the Army to meet wartime needs and then contract it after the conflict. But, generally since WWII, the Army tends to only plan for either the expansion or the contraction. How would the Army plan differently if it developed a holistic plan on how it would both expand for conflict and then contract following conflict? How might that change personnel policy? Procurement policy? Installation planning? Roles of the RC? (POC: COL FcVfHg^i [\Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfHg^i \[\Yg\\$^a \]`4a U`a \]](#), 703-693-3240)

70) In between conflicts, the Army cannot afford to equip and sustain the entire force with the most advanced equipment, but it must be prepared to procure large quantities once war funding is available. The U.S. Army equipment modernization strategy requires an industrial base that can react to the increased quantity demanded during national emergencies while still retaining the ability to buy smaller quantities between major conflicts. What are the implications of this approach on the defense industrial base and what policy adjustments may be needed to make this feasible? (POC: Mr. Tim Muchmore, HQDA G-8, QDR, [timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil](mailto:timothy.s.muchmore.civ@mail.mil), 703-614-5591)

y. *Provide Infrastructure and Support to Fulfill its Strategic Roles and Mission*

71) As the Armed Forces of the United States moves toward a more joint environment, there is a need to better understand the concept and application of joint basing. The Base Realignment and Closure of 2005 (BRAC) recommended the consolidation of numerous service bases into fewer joint bases. The Army, however, has failed to understand, and hence take advantage of, the joint basing concept. Describe the opportunities for the Army that exist with joint basing. Recommend ways to more efficiently align the stationing process across the military departments and services. (POC: LTC Michelle Sanchez, HQDA G-3/5/7, Mobilization, [michelle.sanchez.mil@mail.mil](mailto:michelle.sanchez.mil@mail.mil), 703-693-6153)

72) Evaluate use of contracted logistical support for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF/OEF):

- Should the Army develop a core capability in force structure to provide some aspects of logistical support provided by contractors in OIF/OEF?
- Is there capability within the current BCT structure, ARNG, and USAR that can expand to offset some of the requirements provided by contractors during OIF/OEF? What are the tradeoffs?

(POC: COL FcVfHg^i [\Yg HQDA G-3/5/7, Force Management and Integration, [FcVfHg^i \[\Yg\\$^a \]`4a U`a \]](#), 703-693-3240)

## Long-Term Objectives:

### *z. Field the Army of the Future*

73) What is the role of Landpower in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy? (POC: LTC Francis Park, HQDA G-3/5/7, Strategic Engagements, [francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil](mailto:francis.j.park.mil@mail.mil), 703-692-9450)

74) \*\*\*There currently exists a dangerous gap in the development of Army doctrine in regard to countering potential asymmetric threats. Current doctrinal efforts focus on Phases II and III of the Joint operational planning phases. Propose a strategy for identifying/countering asymmetric threats in Phases 0, I, IV, and V. What are the limits to countering asymmetric threats in these phases? (POC: COL Dick Larry, HQDA G-3/5/7, Adaptive Solutions, [dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil](mailto:dick.a.larry.mil@mail.mil), 703-697-4916)

75) \*\*\*How can the Army efficiently increase collaboration with the other services across the DOTMLPF spectrum towards implementation, and further spiral development, of the Joint Operational Access Concept? Which specific Army capabilities should be prioritized for further and more robust multi-service experimentation and wargaming with follow-on integration into joint exercises to implement and enhance the Joint Operational Access Concept and supporting Air-Sea Battle concept? (POC: COL John Goetz, HQDA G-3/5/7, Air/Sea, [john.c.goetz3.mil@mail.mil](mailto:john.c.goetz3.mil@mail.mil), 703-614-9705)

76) \*\*\*Given previous work with respect to anti-access/area denial in space and the recent Space Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA), what changes to policy, roles, and missions should the Army consider to assure its space-dependent warfighting functions? What capabilities will the Air Force, Navy, and National Reconnaissance Office develop? Will their capabilities serve Army needs in space? If not, then how should the Army alter its roles and missions in space? (POC: @H7 9X 5 bXYfgcb, HQDA G-3/5/7, Space, [9XkUfX@UbXYfgcb@a4aUa](mailto:9XkUfX@UbXYfgcb@a4aUa), 703-607-588+)

77) What constitutes a “hostile act” or an “act of war” when it comes to engagements with UAS? Are UAS-to-UAS engagements acts of war since there is not an imminent threat to loss of human life? How does the right to self-defense change when engaging with UAS? Is the development of rules of engagement with respect to UAS analogous to the development of rules of engagement with respect to aggressive acts in cyberspace? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G-3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems, [james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil](mailto:james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil), 703-693-3552)

78) What is the expanding role of small UAS in ground maneuver units? Within the larger context of maneuver unit reconnaissance, are UASs and traditional aviation

more like complements or substitutes? How do the respective Centers of Excellence best integrate collective UAS and maneuver training? (POC: Mr. James Ryan, HQDA G-3/5/7, Unmanned Aerial Systems, [james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil](mailto:james.c.ryan2.ctr@mail.mil), 703-693-3552)

79) Organizing aviation assets by type makes sense when concerned more about training efficiency than contingency operations. During the past decade-plus of conflict, however, many aviation assets have operated in combat as composite battalion task forces and some have remained organized as composite battalion task forces during their dwell. Given the expected likely future strategic environment, what is the most efficient organization of aviation assets? Should Army Aviation remain organized for contingency operations (i.e., composite battalion task forces) or for training purposes (i.e., same-type aircraft)? (POC: LTC David George, HQDA G-3/5/7, Aviation-Current Operations, [david.a.george.mil@mail.mil](mailto:david.a.george.mil@mail.mil), 703-695-0209)

80) Given the advent of nano-satellite technology and the potential for Army missiles to be converted to low-Earth orbit launch systems, how could tactical satellite constellations be employed to augment space systems or to compensate for loss of space systems in order to ensure space-dependent warfighting functions? What might be the value of low-Earth orbit tactical satellite constellations tailored to ground component needs in particular Joint Operating Areas (JOAs)? (POC: [HQDA.G3.5.7.Space.9XfXfcb@a4aUaJ](mailto:HQDA.G3.5.7.Space.9XfXfcb@a4aUaJ), 703-607-588+)

#### **4. Enhance the All-Volunteer Army**

##### **Continuous Objectives:**

*aa. Maintain an Army that Embraces and Leverages the Diversity of Soldiers and Civilians*

81) Senior Leader Diversity: The Army is behind in its initiatives to ensure a continuing stream of racial/ethnic representation in our officer corps. What policies are needed to address this concern? (JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES)

82) Examine the leadership challenges associated with the recent decision to allow women in combat units and the potential development of gender neutral standards. (Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA])

83) How does the Army change its human resource management to assess, develop, assign, and employ soldiers as individuals, not as generic soldiers?

84) Is suicide an Army or societal problem or both?

85) What issues emerge with the latest cohort of veterans? How does the treatment of veterans affect public opinion of the military?

86) What should the role of retired general officers be in partisan matters?

87) How can ROTC academic standards be adjusted to reflect the needs of the Army?



## USAWC KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST 2013-2014

**Strategic Studies Institute  
and  
U.S. Army War College Press**

**ACADEMIC YEAR 2013-14**

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST**

**PART II:  
COMMAND SPONSORED TOPICS**

**Updated: November 18, 2013**



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## 1. GEOGRAPHICAL COMBATANT COMMANDS

### A. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

(POC: Mr. Michael Bowerbank, [Michael.r.bowerbank.civ@mail.mil](mailto:Michael.r.bowerbank.civ@mail.mil), +49 (0) 711-729-4460)

1) How can the joint force adapt to best implement Program Planning Document (PPD)-23 on security sector assistance? Given the new guidance contained in PPD-23 on Security Sector Assistance and the increased focus on building the capacity of willing security partners, how does the Department of Defense (DoD) further adapt the joint force to conduct this enduring mission? (J5)

2) How does DoD best position itself to partner with other U.S. Government agencies on security sector reform efforts in Africa? What authorities are required to enhance DoD's effectiveness in carrying out security sector reform assistance, including Rule of Law, in Africa? (J9)

3) How can USAFRICOM best support the advancement of women as agents of peace and security? How can USAFRICOM focus its Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) activities with its African partners to best support the U.S. Government's implementation of PPD-16? (J5)

4) How can concepts of gender and the "Responsibility to Protect" be integrated into peace support operations in Africa? (J9)

5) In light of the President's Study Directive (PSD) on Mass Atrocities (PSD-10), what are methods to effectively measure the effectiveness of mass atrocities prevention efforts? What are some of the barriers to U.S. Government efforts to prevent mass atrocities in Africa? (J2)

6) Assess the long-term implications of the Arab Spring on security. What does the future picture of Northern Africa and the Sahel look like? (J9)

7) Assess U.S. Government and international efforts to build defense institutions in Mali, Somalia, and Libya. Are the efforts coordinated, de-conflicted, and complimentary? Do any of them undermine the others? Are they independently sustainable after being implemented, or do they require perpetual U.S. or international partner involvement? (J2)

8) Is South Africa's military overstretched with international peacekeeping operations? What type of assistance would be most beneficial to their participation in peacekeeping operations? (J2)

9) To what extent do Middle Eastern countries influence (military, ideological, economic, and diplomatic) African countries? (J2)

10) What are the short-, medium-, and long-term risks and opportunities to U.S. security of the expansion of Chinese infrastructure in Africa? How can the extensive Chinese computer network infrastructure investments place U.S. security at risk, and what opportunities does it provide? What are the best whole-of-government strategies to ensure U.S. interests are met in Africa despite China's infrastructure expansion engagement strategy? (J3)

11) Assess the ways and means to leverage and increase collaboration, integration, and cost-sharing of USAFRICOM, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), and Western nations' exercises on the African continent. (J7)

12) How can DoD and USAFRICOM best measure effectiveness and return on investment of theater logistics security cooperation in Africa? (J4)

13) Assess the risks inherent in transnational surface distribution networks across Africa and possible mitigation measures. (J4)

14) Assess how the procurement of non-U.S. military equipment is shaping the development of African militaries. (J2)

15) Are African Ministries of Defense and/or security forces employing Non-Lethal weapons (NLWs) and capabilities to mitigate undesired consequences associated with civil disturbances as opposed to using lethal capabilities to address public uprisings? (J3)

16) Do African countries, who contribute forces to Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and Peace Support Operations (PSO), integrate NLW training into their training cycles for PKO/PSO? If so, what types of NLWs are integrated and how are they employing the capabilities, e.g., to provide fixed site security, airfield security, support humanitarian relief operations or some combination thereof? (J3)

17) How can the Army best provide support in an environment that is changing from joint operations to interagency operations? With the environment and asymmetric threat increasing in complexity, the need to work operations with support from the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Transportation (DoT), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), etc., becomes more and more imperative. How should the Army change its doctrine to accommodate near real-time support necessary to achieve national security staff tasked efforts under these new and prevalent conditions? (J3)

## B. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)

1) The global technology enhanced environment requires strategic awareness by joint force commanders. This awareness requires an understanding of the operational environment within and adjacent to the joint operating area (JOA) at the tactical and operational as well as the strategic theater level. What should the Common Operating Picture (COP) and Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) portray for leaders preparing for and conducting joint operations from subordinate joint task force (JTF) and functional component through combatant command (CCMD) HQ levels? (POC: Mr. Jerry Boyle, CCJ2-PS, [Jerome.boyle@centcom.mil](mailto:Jerome.boyle@centcom.mil), 813-529-2072)

2) What are the implications to Middle East regional security resulting from Iranian assertiveness and malign behavior? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

3) What are the regional implications following a withdrawal of U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

4) Evaluate possibilities and strategic implications of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian expansion of their interests in Afghanistan. (Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G, [Michael.puffer@centcom.mil](mailto:Michael.puffer@centcom.mil), 813-529-5065)

5) Assess Pakistan's strategic options towards U.S. strategy in the region, especially towards Afghanistan. (LCDR Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G, [Michael.puffer@centcom.mil](mailto:Michael.puffer@centcom.mil), 813-529-5065)

6) What are the implications of emerging military relationships within the Middle East dealing with counterterrorism? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

7) How does an increasingly resource constrained environment over the next 10 years impact current U.S.-Middle East regional strategy? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

8) Should the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) boundaries between USEUCOM and USCENTCOM as specified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) be redrawn to expand the reach of USCENTCOM to the waters adjacent to the Levant? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

9) Evaluate the opportunities and challenges to transfer operations control (OPCON) of American forces to foreign commanders. Assess the required changes to founding documents to enable this transfer. Assess changes to tactics, techniques and

Procedures (TTPs) to ensure success of such a transfer. (LCDR Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G, [Michael.puffer@centcom.mil](mailto:Michael.puffer@centcom.mil), 813-529-5065)

10) How should the Army train Soldiers for missions in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, where great emphasis is placed on the limitation of civilian casualties (CIVAS) and the use of NLW throughout the Escalation of Force (EOF) continuum, while still retaining warfighting as its primary mission, while not losing its edge as the nation's premier combatant force? (Dr. Mike Sizemore, CCJ7-E, [Michael.sizemore@centcom.mil](mailto:Michael.sizemore@centcom.mil), 813-529-7060)

11) The fiscal constraints we are facing, combined with desired strategic objectives, require USCENTCOM and Components to maximize resources within a multinational exercise strategy. This strategy will increase joint integration, interoperability, and information sharing between partner nations. In addition, it will offer greater strategic messaging opportunities emphasizing a broader coalition within the region supporting the commander's (CDR) guidance and priorities. How can we improve this process? (Dr. Mike Sizemore, CCJ7-E, [Michael.sizemore@centcom.mil](mailto:Michael.sizemore@centcom.mil), 813-529-7060)

12) How can a CCMD effectively and synchronously acquire, aggregate, and synthesize pertinent information on the results and effects created across all elements of power employed to achieve theater objectives? (Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Michaud, CCJ8-ARB, [john.michaud@centcom.mil](mailto:john.michaud@centcom.mil), 813-529-8121)

13) Wargaming provides CCMDs the opportunity to visualize various courses of action (COAs) and in doing so, identify risks, opportunities, and potentially better means and ways for accomplishing the mission. What are the best practices being leveraged within DoD and among the CCMDs? How do the CCMDs integrate wargaming into their deliberate and hasty planning processes? What tools, techniques, and practices are available to improve wargaming efforts? (LTC John Michaud, CCJ8-ARB, [john.michaud@centcom.mil](mailto:john.michaud@centcom.mil), 813-529-8121)

#### Logistics and Deployment:

14) Examine the posturing options and recommend the best employment of Army land-based prepositioned (PREPO material and Operational Project Stocks) in the conduct of a maritime campaign in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment. (Mr. Richard Lliteras, CCJ4-S, [Richard.lliteras@centcom.mil](mailto:Richard.lliteras@centcom.mil), 813-529-4054)

15) Examine the relevance of the Army's expeditionary railroad capability in support of expeditionary operations, coalition deployment and redeployment support, line of communication (LOC) expansion, and regional economic development. (Mr. Larry Pleis, CCJ4-S, [Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil](mailto:Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil), 813-529-4053)



16) Concerning operational contracting—is the Army postured adequately to support the Joint Force? (Mr. Larry Pleis, CCJ4-S, [Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil](mailto:Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil), 813-529-4053)

17). Conduct a comparative analysis of a Joint Logistics Command and a Joint Task Force for Logistics to support enduring and contingency Combatant Commander requirements. (Mr. Larry Pleis, CCJ4-S, [Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil](mailto:Lawrence.j.pleis@centcom.mil), 813-529-4053)

18) Evaluate the impact of a closure of the Suez Canal on Army deployments into the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). (LCDR Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G, [Michael.puffer@centcom.mil](mailto:Michael.puffer@centcom.mil), 813-529-5065)

19) Propose an ideal Army posture in the CENTCOM AOR with ways to shift from the current basing structure. (LCDR Michael J. Puffer, CCJ5-G, [Michael.puffer@centcom.mil](mailto:Michael.puffer@centcom.mil), 813-529-5065)

Medical issues:

20) Referencing historical Special Operations Forces (SOF) leadership and directives from General (GEN) Stanley McChrystal and Admiral (ADM) William McRaven, would DoD medical systems also benefit from a “flattening of the organization”? Do current hierarchical systems sacrifice leadership, innovation, and progress, and promote micromanagement, parochial processes, and risk aversion? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

21) Do all garrison DoD Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) truly provide unique care to military personnel and their families? What are the pros and cons of reducing the number of garrison DoD Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) MTFs? What is the cost-benefit analysis for more care transferred to local civilian facilities? Additionally, can more military medical personnel and assets be decentralized and located with Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units in order to accommodate a military Patient and Family Centered Home model? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

22) As warfare has progressed from fighting conventionally as divisions, brigades, and battalions to fighting unconventionally as companies, platoons, and squads, how can medical systems best accommodate care in this paradigm? If a paradigm shift is required, what medical structure will lead to a strategy and culture that best supports the combatant? (Mr. BJ Keepers, CCJ3-O-CAL, [bj.keepers@centcpom.mil](mailto:bj.keepers@centcpom.mil), 813-529-3354)

### **C. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)**

POC: Mr. Trevor Boyko, J9 (Academic Program manager), [trevor.j.boyko.civ@mail.mil](mailto:trevor.j.boyko.civ@mail.mil),  
DSN: 314-430-5793

- 1) Recommend ways to synchronize EU, NATO, and U.S. goals for the modernization of European militaries.
- 2) Assess the strategic implications of reduced national defense spending on the long-term defense relationship between NATO, the EU, and the United States.
- 3) Assess the impact of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN/UNIFIED PROTECTOR on the development of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
- 4) Analyze energy security in Europe, including operational, infrastructure, and strategic energy security, and related implications for the U.S. Army.
- 5) Evaluate the long-term impact of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations on NATO interoperability and sustainability.
- 6) Assess the prospects for Russo-American security and/or defense cooperation.
- 7) Assess the impact of growing diversity of populations on European security policy.
- 8) Assess the effectiveness of security cooperation programs in promoting stability in the Balkans.
- 9) Assess the strategic and operational implications of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in Europe.
- 10) Recommend ways for closing the U.S.-European military capabilities gap.
- 11) Recommend ways the United States can leverage European engagement with China.
- 12) Assess the implications of U.S.-European defense industry cooperation and/or integration.
- 13) Evaluate how the United States can leverage security cooperation tools (to include Foreign military Sales [FMS], international military education and training program [IMET], etc.), exercise program, and world-class training centers as force

multipliers to sustain capabilities/interoperability in Europe developed over the past decade of war in Afghanistan.

14) Assess what synergies are possible between NATO, EU, and EUCOM/AFRICOM.

15) Evaluate the nonkinetic options for the theater commander in order to achieve Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) End-states.

16) Evaluate the feasibility of deliberate multinational contingency planning.

17) Inventory and analyze authorities available within NATO, EU, and EUCOM for engagement with the private sector to meet EUCOM/DoD objectives.

18) Evaluate the impact of the Arab Spring on cross-COCOM coordination for EUCOM-AFRICOM-CENTCOM. Is coordination and response time improved? Are there more lessons to be learned?

19) Assess the future of NATO post-ISAF.

20) Evaluate the synchronization of Knowledge Management and Lessons Learned programs across theaters.

#### **D. U.S. Northern Command**

1) Incident Assessment and Awareness (IAA) Capabilities in Support of Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA): DOD policy is to anticipate civil authority requests (mission assignments) for assets in support of responding to incidents. This policy is partly based upon the circumstances that existed at the end of Hurricane Katrina. For the past several years, civil authorities have not taken advantage of advanced Title 10 IAA capabilities. There are various conditions that contribute to this decline in requests to include response time, legal issues, and institutional resistance. One major argument has been the proliferation of sensors within the other federal departments as well as state and local governments. Determine the efficacy of the current DoD policy regarding employment of IAA capabilities and propose a recommendation to continue the current policy or make a different proposal based upon updated research. Make distinction, if any, between Title 10 and Title 32 capabilities. Address both service auxiliary and Emergency Management Assistance Compact agreements. (POC: Mr. James Solano, HQ USNORTHCOM J33/JRC, *James.Solano@northcom.mil*; 719-554-6774 DSN 692-6774)

2) Dual Status Command Concepts for Multistate Incidents: Dual status command arrangements, which require the approval of both the President and the State Governor, work well when a disaster or incident is confined to a single state. The concept becomes problematic, however, for complex catastrophes spanning multiple states, and requiring regional Dual Status Commands to reduce span of control issues. No provision exists in the U.S. Constitution for regional authorities between the various states and the federal government. As a result, no equivalent dual status command arrangement has been developed for regional command and control that is acceptable to both state and federal officials. Recommend an acceptable dual status command arrangement for multistate incidents. POC: Mr. Donald Reed, HQ USNORTHCOM J35, [Donald.Reed@northcom.mil](mailto:Donald.Reed@northcom.mil); 719-556-8227 DSN 834-8227)

3) Security Paradox in Terms of Homeland Defense: General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), stated in May 2012 at the Joint Warfighting Conference: "Today's security paradox, though, doesn't call for larger or a smaller military. Instead, it calls for a different military, one capable of deterring, denying, and defeating threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. What does this mean for the force? The joint force we have is in need of reset." The Chairman went on to say, "We also know that in the future, our homeland will not be the sanctuary it has been." What situations/conditions define the United States and its territories in a state of crisis, and what authorities are required to permit the DoD to perform its defense of the homeland task in a timely manner? (POC: Lieutenant Colonel [LTC] Kyle Marsh, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM N2C2, [Kyle.Marsh@northcom.mil](mailto:Kyle.Marsh@northcom.mil); 719-556-8890 DSN 834-8890)

4) Counter Transnational Organized Crime networks: How do we foster an all-in culture for integrating all the elements of national power in countering threat networks, and how do we develop the skilled cultural awareness for overcoming cultural barriers to collaboration, information sharing, and synchronized action? Does a whole-of-government effort to counter transnational organized crime networks and illicit activity require building virtual organizations as organizational networks? If so, how should such networked structures be built, led, employed, and designed? (POC: Dr. Rick Morris, Joint Task Force-NORTH, [Rodier.Morris@jtfn.northcom.mil](mailto:Rodier.Morris@jtfn.northcom.mil); 515-313-7736)

5) Common Operating Picture (COP) in the Homeland: Shared Situational Awareness is currently achieved through the use of multiple collaboration tools used by DoD and Interagency Partners. Many of these platforms are not compatible and cannot share information. In addition, a major limitation for NORAD and USNORTHCOM is that certain tools used by the DoD do not allow non-DoD personnel access. At present, each State/Territory/Agency uses different collaboration tools (i.e., Web EOC, SAGE, Google Earth, CPOF, DCO, etc.). Most of these tools are not compatible and make it very difficult to share information. Information sharing is critical to operational success during a DSCA event. Classification of information during a DSCA event is important,

and NORTHCOM requires certain collaboration be classified Secret. However, when information is classified U.S. Secret, it cannot be shared with interagency partners, traditional quadripartite allies, and noncleared personnel. COP is an ongoing and expensive issue, and, while federal agencies are trying to find solutions to gaining a national common operating picture, states are less interested because their ability to “see” within their state is already relatively robust. Dissimilar systems, over-classification, access to organizational portals, and placing unclassified information on classified systems are major impediments to generating a common operating picture at a national level to inform decisions made by national leaders, to include DoD. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) reports they have good collaboration connectivity with the States and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), but stakeholders need to agree on the goal—what needs to be shared—and then work on looking at solutions. (POC: MAJ Richard Martin, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM J74, [Richard.Martin@northcom.mil](mailto:Richard.Martin@northcom.mil); 719-556-7809, DSN 834-7809)

6) Timely DoD response to DSCA operations: The Mission Assignment (MA) process and the National Response Framework (NRF) are challenged in near-complex and complex catastrophes, as noted in Hurricane Sandy response operations. For purposes of lessons learned, there was an assumption formed that in this complex catastrophe scenario the NRF did not completely apply. If that were so, then some replacement parameters needed to be established. For example, if a Title 10 (T10) response is not driven by the MA process and Defense Coordinating Officer vetting, then some sort of anticipatory immediate response type construct needs to be established. While this rushing to the sound of the guns may be emotionally satisfying or even politically expedient, it is inefficient and may even interfere with rapid assistance as it as it potentially clogs up lines of communication and limited Base Support Intermediate (BSI) space in/near the JOA as forces push forward without being called forward. If Hurricane Sandy is seen as an archetype of a complex catastrophe, then a careful analysis of the effectiveness of the DoD response within the context of dual status commanders, lead federal agencies, and state response capabilities needs to be conducted. It should incorporate insights from the on-going DoD complex catastrophe effort. From this combined analysis, it may be possible to derive a “worst case” T10 response model that builds on the NRF at least to the point where all players understand the ground rules for response and have a common point of departure for action. (POC: MAJ Richard Martin, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM J74, [Richard.Martin@norlhcom.mil](mailto:Richard.Martin@norlhcom.mil); 719-556-7809 DSN 834-7809)

7) Emergency Management Assistance Compacts: The evolution and efficiency of states’ Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) is moving forward rapidly. With the help of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in Lexington, Kentucky, much more disaster response capability is becoming available faster than it has in the past. All 54 states and territories are now legal partners. Notification-to-deployment timelines have been drastically reduced by computer- aided

resource identification, costing, etc. How should Title 10 forces' planning be adjusted to keep pace with evolving state EMAC progress? What is the relationship between EMAC advances and the need for Title 10 DSCA responsiveness and capabilities? (POC: Mr. David Wilkins, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM J72, [David.Wilkins.ctr@norlhcom.mil](mailto:David.Wilkins.ctr@norlhcom.mil); 719-474-8322, No DSN)

8) Arctic Maritime Surveillance: Investigate the optimal force layout (sensors, ships, and aircraft) to detect and track maritime contacts in the Alaskan Arctic Region. Recommend a maritime search and track sensor strategy for the Alaskan Arctic region. (POC: MAJ Francis Mindrup, HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM J84, [francis.mindrup@norlhcom.mil](mailto:francis.mindrup@norlhcom.mil); 719-554-0587; DSN 692-0587)

9) Electronic Warfare System Employment within Canada and the United States: Examine the complex web of agencies and organizations connected to the electromagnetic spectrum and how it impacts potential employment of electronic warfare (EW) systems in defense of the Homeland and Canada. Provide a viable concept of operations of employment of EW systems within Canada and the United States in support of Homeland Defense and aerospace sovereignty. (POC: Mr. John Wilson, HQ USNORTHCOM J39, [john.wilson@northcom.mil](mailto:john.wilson@northcom.mil); 719-554-1500; DSN 692-1500)

#### **E. U.S. Pacific Command**

(POC: Major [MAJ] Tom Kucik, J561, [Thomas.j.kucik.mil@mail.mil](mailto:Thomas.j.kucik.mil@mail.mil), 808-477-9107)

##### **1) U.S. Army theater security cooperation in Asia-Pacific:**

a. How can the Army provide theater security cooperation to emerging partners in the Asia-Pacific in a way that strengthens multilateral cooperation and encourages adherence to international norms of behavior?

b. How does the U.S. Army determine the right mix or capabilities through Security Cooperation Plans?

c. How can the U.S. Army ensure these activities are coordinated with other services and regional allies?

##### **2) U.S. Army role in engaging and deterring China:**

a. What role does the Army have to play in engaging and deterring China?

b. What are the requirements for U.S. Army forward presence in the Pacific to meet this mission?



c. How can the new four-star U.S. Army command in the Pacific support this joint mission?

3) Future of the U.S. Army on the Korean Peninsula:

a. What is the future of the U.S. Army on the Korean Peninsula?

b. What are the most important strategic considerations for managing potential conflict on the peninsula?

4) U.S. Army balance between theater security cooperation and theater engagement with a force ready to fight tonight:

a. How does the Army balance requirements for a force capable of conducting theater engagement and security cooperation activities with a force ready to fight tonight?

b. What has been the impact of the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program and how can it be better leveraged to bring regional expertise to the theater?

## **F. U.S. Southern Command**

1) Are China, Russia and Iran seeking to displace the US as the partner of choice in the Caribbean, Central and South America? In depth study that focuses either on the engagement of one partner of interest (China, Russia or Iran) in USSOUTHCOM or a broader examination of the relationships that one or more countries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR has with all three partners of interest.  
(POC: Lt Col Dave Holm J53, [david.m.holm.mil@mail.mil](mailto:david.m.holm.mil@mail.mil), 305-437-1838)

2) Is there a better way to fight the war on drugs? Examine the changing political situation in both Central and North America regarding legalization and the current counter-drug (CD) efforts. With the changing political landscape, how can military efforts be redirected to increase effectiveness? Develop alternatives to US CD policy and military operations.  
(POC: Maj Beth Rosario J53, [beth.a.rosario.mil@mail.mil](mailto:beth.a.rosario.mil@mail.mil), 305-437-2440)

3) IO during Mass Migration events. Identify IO themes, messages and audiences in mass migration operations. Identify stakeholders in the USG and the public, private sector. Create generic themes and messages for mass migration. Determine possible unforced errors.  
(POC: Lt Col Dave Holm J53, [david.m.holm.mil@mail.mil](mailto:david.m.holm.mil@mail.mil), 305-437-1838)

4) Socio-Cultural Analysis (SCA), also commonly known as the Human Terrain Initiative (HTI), and Human Geography, (HG), provides knowledge and understanding of the "people element," the underlying socio-cultural element that supports "Phase 0" operations. For some combatant commands, Phase 0 Operations is the primary mission with their respective partner nations. The U.S. Southern Command mission is to protect the southern approaches to the United States. Intelligence enables mission accomplishment with an economy of force through partner engagement to build partner nation capability. A better understanding of the diverse populations of the region supports all USSOUTHCOM Phase 0-priority engagement activities and enables development of mitigation strategies for future Joint Intelligence and Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE) activities. This type of initiative is especially needed in an operating environment like USSOUTHCOM's, which has no state-on-state conflict but where fragile democracies and governing issues grow allow insidious threats such as illicit trafficking, crime, authoritarianism and terrorism to seep across borders. A robust and effective socio-cultural analytical capacity advances the broader DoD goal of developing institutional and organic SCA knowledge and analysis appropriate for contemporary and future security challenges. Requirements for this type of knowledge will endure beyond any period of supplemental funding, as the need for socio-cultural knowledge within USSOUTHCOM Area of Focus (AOF) will persist indefinitely. Primary objective is to establish a baseline SCA capability at USSOUTHCOM. (POC: Edward Daes J23, [Edward.j.daes.civ@mail.mil](mailto:Edward.j.daes.civ@mail.mil), 305-437-0135)

5) Private Sector Contribution to Stability and Security. The DoD conducts many stability operations around the world. Most of these activities are of short duration and impact and have not been proven to substantially increase security or stability. Working with private sector (i.e., business) has shown promise in extending the reach, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of these types of activities. Produce a research project, using case histories, that describes how the private sector can contribute to security and stability in an uncertain environment (i.e. one that is recovering from conflict or has an active stability issue related to insurgency, terrorism, drug trafficking organization, etc.). Provide recommendations on how DoD can work with the private sector and the Partner Nation to maximize the private sector's contribution to security/stability. (POC: Mr. Shawn Powell, Chief Business Engagement Branch J9, [murray.powell1@hq.southcom.mil](mailto:murray.powell1@hq.southcom.mil), 305-437-2743)

6) Using Social Media as a Method for Early Indications & Warnings of Biological Threats. In July 2012, President Obama issued a national strategy for biosurveillance that directs federal agencies to think outside the box in detecting incidents. "Consider social media as a force multiplier that can empower individuals and communities to provide early warning and global situational awareness," the guidelines stated. The strategy cites a number of recent threats to underscore the need for innovative biosurveillance, including the 2001 anthrax letters, 2003 SARS outbreak, 2009 bird flu pandemic and 2011 Japan nuclear emergency. The Department of Homeland has

commissioned Accenture to test technology that mines open social networks for indications of pandemics, according to the vendor. The Department of Defense, Department of Health & Human Services, Department of Agriculture, and others have implemented similar efforts. Google and other private sector partners have also implemented activities that look to capitalize on social media and its ability to forecast. This capstone project will examine what has been attempted/implemented/planned across both the private sector and U.S. Government to explore how social media can be utilized as an early indications & warnings tool. Students working on this capstone will conduct a thorough literature review relating to past/present/intended applications of social media being used to 1) serve as an early indication/warning tool and 2) forecast biological threats. By the end of the capstone period the student will have developed a detailed literature database on social media as it relates to being used/intended for an early indication/warning of biological threats; 2) By the end of the capstone period the student will have created a presentation that summarizes what they have found in the literature; and 3) By the end of the capstone period the student will have developed a framework for publishing an article for a professional journal that summarizes results from their research. The capstone student will co-author an article with the Open Source Center representative and HHS Senior Advisor at SOUTHCOM that will a) report a literature review, b) describe how the USG is currently using social media for early indications & warnings, and c) speculate on potential future directions for the USG and other international partners as it relates to using social media for forecasting biological threats.

(POC: CDR Michael Schmoyer J92, DHHS LNO, [michael.schmoyer@hq.southcom.mil](mailto:michael.schmoyer@hq.southcom.mil), 305-437-0523)

7) What's Good for the People is Good for the Company? An analysis of the effectiveness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs in Latin America. A study of CSR programs and effects. What is a CSR program? What are the objectives of a CSR program? What elements contribute or detract from an organization being a "good corporate citizen?" Does it contribute to "the bottom line" of the company and/or the community within which the company/program acts? Is the "bottom line" more than profits for the company? What are the benefits to the community, and are they meaningful and sustainable? So your company has a CSR program - so what? Is it "good business?" Do CSR programs contribute to the stability and prosperity of a community/nation? How do CSR programs play into politics? Do CSR programs undercut or enhance the legitimacy/effectiveness of government? The student/candidate should explore all facets of select CSR programs in effect in Latin America and/or the Caribbean. Does effectiveness vary when analyzing CSR programs of foreign-owned companies versus domestic companies, large companies versus medium or small companies, one industry segment versus another, etc? Perhaps explore ways for government/military/SOUTHCOM to be mutually supporting with the private sector to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of public-private projects.

(POC: Mr. John Dickerson, Dept of Commerce, [john.dickerson@hq.southcom.mil](mailto:john.dickerson@hq.southcom.mil), 305-437-2290)

## **2. Functional Combatant Commands**

### **A. U.S. Cyber Command**

(POC: Mr. Blane Clark, J51 (Strategy Division), [brclark@cybercom.mil](mailto:brclark@cybercom.mil), (443) 654-2501)

1) What are the diplomatic and military implications of formally establishing a NATO cyberspace military capability? What should a combined cyber force consist of, with what rules of engagement, and what synchronization/deconfliction process? How might a coalition execute cyberspace operations? How might other elements of national power, available to the coalition from its members, be integrated?

2) In view of the strategic risks in and through cyberspace to U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources, how might the private sector be integrated for a whole-of-nation response? What legal (to include regulatory) policy and financial security issues would need to be resolved?

3) What are the national strategic implications, both positive and negative, for military involvement in cyber defense of non-DoD critical infrastructure? What are the related political and economic issues that would require resolution?

4) Are current cyber policies, related Army and DoD directives and instructions, and Army and Joint military doctrine sufficient to underpin defensive and offensive effect operations, to achieve desired strategic outcomes?

5) What constitutes key strategic cyber terrain for DoD, both currently and 5 years from now? What criteria are germane to ascertain key strategic cyber terrain?

6) What characterizes strategic deterrence in cyberspace? Is deterrence a precursor to defense? Is it part and parcel of a continuum from deterrence through defense, to include cyberspace defense operations beyond the DoD Information networks (DODIN)? Can deterrence be applied through a whole-of-nation approach?

7) What might constitute a value model for investments in cyberspace capabilities and capacity, to include force structure for cyberspace security, DODIN operations, and defensive and offensive cyberspace operations? What might constitute the investment for each separately, and then as an aggregate? Are there dual purpose investments?

8) What might the corporate approach be for DoD to ensure career long training and education continuum for a trained and ready cyber workforce?

9) Should the Army, and DoD at large, totally embrace a cloud computing architecture in the evolution of the DODIN? What are the strategic and operational challenges to doing so and not doing so?

10) What might be a useful model for more accurately assessing and portraying measurable cyber threat levels beyond the two attributes of threat intent and capability? How might such a model be implemented across all of DoD?

11) Is there a strategic trade-off economically between costs to defend versus costs to attack? What would the parameters be of such a trade-off analysis? What trending indications might be observable by such a trade-off analysis?

12) How should the concepts of sovereignty, ownership, possession, privacy, theft, right of self-defense and other concepts of social, political and international norms be considered and applied when planning and executing operations in cyberspace?

13) What are the ethical limits of taking action in cyberspace where there is an apparent lack of established norms and rule of law? How might the U.S. Government establish international norms of behavior in cyberspace? What about rule of law for the international community regarding actions in cyberspace?

14) How could the Army develop and establish a cyber career path for both Officers and Enlisted personnel? What would constitute accession and retention criteria? What incentives might be integrated in accession and retention initiatives?

## **B. U.S. Transportation Command**

1) Cost Efficiency in Defense Transportation-Logistics at the Expense of Effectiveness:

**Background/Additional Details:** The current National Security Strategy focuses on a more agile, rapidly-deployable, continental U.S. (CONUS)-based force versus a more expensive, forward-based outside of the continental U.S. (OCONUS) force. This agile force will be even more reliant on timely and reliable TRANSLOG capabilities. The overwhelming majority of today's defense logistics is performed by commercial entities, both U.S. and international, because of their efficiency and lower costs. Does DoD's dependency on commercial TRANSLOG capabilities expose this force to new and unforeseen vulnerabilities that could render it incapable of deployment and/or sustainment? (Commander [CDR] James Bond/TCJ2-O/DSN 770-7236/[james.bond@ustranscom.mil](mailto:james.bond@ustranscom.mil))

2) How should the Joint Staff deconflict/prioritize competing demands for strategic lift between combatant commands in order to fight in two different theaters simultaneously?

**Background/Additional Details:** During initial stages of deployment operations there is a large demand for tankers and strategic Airlift. What considerations should/would the Joint Staff use to arbitrate competing interests? What is the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) role? (Major [MAJ] Aldaberto Pagan/TCJ3-T/DSN 770-4931/[adalberto.pagan@ustranscom.mil](mailto:adalberto.pagan@ustranscom.mil))

3) How can the Army's 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) (7th TB(X)) currently under development be resourced/postured to provide a limited, early-in port opening capability (C+7) for the geographic combatant commander?

**Background/Additional Details:** USTRANSCOM provides several theater distribution enabler capabilities to the supported geographic combatant commander which necessitates very short response times. Joint Force 2020 requires the future force to be globally agile and rapidly deployable. USTRANSCOM must quickly project that force despite the enemy's anti-access/aerial denial efforts. The Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO) Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) and Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD) capabilities currently incorporate Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and Navy elements to accomplish the mission for nonaustere and undamaged seaports. However, the most demanding mission, opening/operating an austere and damaged port, is heavily dependent on Navy forces attached to the mission via a memorandum of agreement with USTRANSCOM. If the 7th TB(X), an 18th Airborne Corps or 3rd ESC asset (Army decision TBD), is made modular, scalable, and deployable by air to arrive in theater by C+7, the JTF-PO SPOD would be more effective to support this theater commander-desired mission. (Pat Kennedy/TCJ5-SS/DSN 770-4764/[patrick.kennedy.ctr@ustranscom.mil](mailto:patrick.kennedy.ctr@ustranscom.mil))

4) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns several important strategic transportation and synchronization missions to USTRANSCOM. Two items in the Key Strategic Issues List have a direct relationship to the USTRANSCOM UCP missions:

Item 13: "Determine COAs to equip the RAF concept." This is an interesting topic and worthy of more in-depth study. Of special concern to USTRANSCOM is how rotational forces will be logistically supported with tactical casualty evacuation and how it links with aeromedical evacuation.

Item 42: "Evaluate the tradeoffs of power projection, prepositioning and forward stationing." This is particularly relevant given the discussions among the combatant commanders and Services chiefs in the CJCS Strategic Seminar Series. (Mark Luttschwager/TCAC/DSN 770-5243/[mark.luttschwager1.civ@mail.mil](mailto:mark.luttschwager1.civ@mail.mil))



### 3. Other Major Commands

#### A. U.S. Army Materiel Command

POC: Mr. Curt Higdon, HQAMC G3/4 (Strategic Integration), [marvin.c.higdon.civ@mail.mil](mailto:marvin.c.higdon.civ@mail.mil), 256-450-6845

1) With reductions in forward deployed forces, we must determine the appropriate force mix and Army Prepositioned Stocks strategy that allows us to remain flexible, agile, and quickly deployable in our support to the warfighter. What is the right mix of logistics functions between the Guard/Reserve and active forces, and what assets must we maintain to project support to our regionally aligned forces?

2) Analyze future support requirements for SOF and small footprint operations. How do these differ, and what are the needs of each? What COIN logistics lessons learned apply to these situations?

3) Analyze future contractor logistic support as risk mitigation for reductions in support forces. What types of support are best and less suited for contractors?

4) What are the key research, development, technology and engineering capabilities necessary for the Army to support the future Organic Industrial Base and maintain the Army's technological advantage?

5) As we increasingly address nonpermissive environments and the cyber threat builds against an ever more IT dependent global transportation network, we must make renewed efforts to secure our lines of communication. What communications infrastructure is key to ensuring the continuity of the global supply chain? Which of them require preferential investments for security? What backup capabilities are required / affordable to ensure redundancy?

6) As we restructure the generating force, we must first identify the "Core capabilities" that are not inherently governmental and which capabilities cannot be contracted out. We must consider what commercial off-the-shelf equipment may not be available in the future and the acceptable risk on single source facilities. Based on these considerations, should the Army restructure support to the Industrial base, and if so, how?

7) In a period of dwindling resources, we must identify which of the eight or nine sectors of the Organic Industrial Base (and underlying elements) are truly critical enough to warrant preferential investment. Further, it is imperative that we determine the appropriate levels required to maintain legacy production capabilities to support the anticipated future force structure and new technologies. What capabilities can we divest which can be rapidly regenerated or procured by another service? What is the

acceptable level of risk from divestiture? Consider the mandated 50/50 government/contractor split and determine if it is still the proper ratio.

8) In his strategic direction to the Joint Force, the CJCS directed that we “Identify and reduce, but do not eliminate, overlapping capabilities across the Services.” What are the areas that the Army can best accomplish or can alone accomplish in support of the joint force? Are there areas such as joint repair facilities where we can partner with sister services or Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners to achieve a better end? How must we adapt our equipment and training to be more interoperable in the JIIM? Should we invest in adapting our equipment to allow greater interoperability with and reliance upon our JIIM partners?

#### **B. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)**

(POC: MAJ Chris Bowers, ATFC-EF, [christopher.o.bowers.mil@mail.mil](mailto:christopher.o.bowers.mil@mail.mil), 757-501-5499)

1) Deterrence in the Deep Future (2030-40): How does the Army contribute to unified action partner efforts to deter various nonstate actors? What are the implications for the Army of the deep future? The operational environment in 2030-40 is likely to include nonstate actors who have increased influence regionally and globally, with access to technologies and capabilities that pose an actual threat to the United States. These nonstate actors may include violent extremist groups, super-empowered individuals (a la Thomas L. Friedman’s super-empowered angry man, not Jason Bourne), malicious hackers, corporations, criminal enterprises, narco-terrorists, and combinations of the preceding. The interests of these nonstate actors, and their make-up, are likely to be such that traditional concepts of deterrence are ineffective.

#### **Future Concepts:**

2) Clash of wills: How will the Army of the future (joint force) win the clash of wills? War is a clash of wills—our will, our partners’ wills, and our adversaries’ wills. A significant part of this clash is the “war of the narrative,” a nonkinetic conflict which will be persistent and occur in the homeland and globally.

3) Strategic Landpower: What are the implications of strategic Landpower force development? Strategic Landpower is the application of Landpower to achieve desired strategic outcomes across the range of military operations. Joint land forces (Army, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), special operations) integrate all domains and provide the means—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. The Army in particular provides sustained land forces to buttress diplomatic actions and intervene when necessary.

4) Expeditionary Maneuver: What capabilities does an Army expeditionary maneuver concept require? The Army must project strategic Landpower in tailored and scaled force packages to conduct a variety of missions and respond to a wide range of threats, in alignment with joint concepts. Specifically address combat loading, communications en route to the objective, joint fires employment, and global force movement by sea and air to expedite reinforcement and sustainment of initial entry forces.

5) Army Operating Concept: Assess the validity of the 2013 *Army Operating Concept* (central idea, components of the solution, and supporting ideas). Does the 2013 *Army Operating Concept* align with joint concepts? Are new concepts and capabilities required?

6) Army Functional Concepts: How must Army Functional Concepts develop in support of the 2013 *Army Operating Concept*? Are new concepts and capabilities required?

7) Science and Technology: What long-term investments are required today to ensure an Army able to meet all required missions in 2030-40?

#### **Capability Requirements:**

8) Army advantages: How should the Army maintain and strengthen its comparative advantages into the future:

a. Leader development—the Army is the premier institution developing leaders;

b. Command and control—the ability to provide commanders intent and intelligence over large distances and scalable formations;

c. Sustained logistics—the ability to logistically support large and small formations around the world;

d. Mobility—the ability to tactically solve problems on the ground, operationally build formations and employ them in current and future missions, and strategically move forces around the world by air, land, and sea.

9) What capabilities are required to improve an Army entry force's mobility, protection, and lethality?

10) What capabilities are required to improve the Army's ability to conduct operations in multiple domains? The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, *Joint Operational Access Concept*, and 2013 *Army Operating Concept* all describe the need for cross-domain synergy.

### **Capability Solutions:**

11) Human Dimension: Human capital is the Army's number one priority. What investments are necessary for the Army to be the experts in physical, cognitive, and leader development, and individual and team design?

12) Human Domain/Context: The Army must understand and be able to influence the context in which humans interact, particularly as the force gets smaller. What investments must the Army make in education and training to build Soldiers' socio-cultural intelligence quotient?

13) The Squad: What must the Army do to improve the squad's ability to achieve local overmatch in all warfighting functions? The Army delivers squads, whether one or one thousand. Building the future squad correctly will achieve tactical mobility for the Army. In particular address what the Army must do to lighten the load on the squad and Soldiers through improved systems and discipline.

### **Gender Issues:**

(POC: Colonel [COL] Lynette M.B. Arnhart, Deputy Director and Senior Military Analyst TRADOC Analysis Center, [lynette.m.arnhart.mil@mail.mil](mailto:lynette.m.arnhart.mil@mail.mil), 913-684-9214)

1) Compare the factors affecting readiness in gender integrated and nongender integrated units, and study how measures of unit effectiveness are the same or different between gender integrated and nonintegrated units.

2) Study how gender affects the development of team identification, task cohesion, and the development of trust at team, squad, and platoon level.

3) What training is needed and what is the optimal level of training required for effective gender integration?

4) What training is needed to effectively transfer women officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) into previously closed military occupational specialties (MOS). (The Army routinely transfers officers out of combat arms into other branches but not vice versa. We do not know that applying the same training mechanisms to the reverse process is adequate.)

5) Exam how morale in units is related to the incidence of sexual assault and harassment.

### **C. U.S. Army Reserve Command**

(POC: LTC Patrick M. Pascall, [Patrick.m.pascall.mil@mail.mil](mailto:Patrick.m.pascall.mil@mail.mil), (703) 806-7368)

The Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) is the theme of the Army Reserve's 2014 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) submission.

1) The main question for strategic analysis and research: How can the Army Reserve (AR) best shape, implement and reinforce the ATFP?

a) *Force Structure*: Implementation of ATFP requires amending Army regulations to establish a formal annual analysis of force structure options that specifically includes consideration of the mix of operating and generating force capabilities between the Active Component (AC) and AR. How does this policy change the structure of the AR?

b) *Readiness Policy/ Procedures*: ATFP directs available mission and surge forces deploy as integrated expeditionary forces to the maximum extent possible. How does this affect AR Soldiers and their families?

c) *Culture Shift*: Implementation of ATFP may change the culture of the AR. Describe the culture change and its impact to the AR.

d) *Educate and Train*: How will integration of the ATFP be reflected in Army doctrine? How will the Army incorporate the ATFP into institutional education/training? How could the Army benefit from, and implement, multi-component faculty and students for all schools to include pre-command courses? How could the Army benefit from, and implement, a multi-component approach to Total Army Training for conventional forces?

e) *Equipping*: The Army's equipping strategy must ensure that procurement and equipping processes enable the AR to perform its missions. How does the ATFP change determination of equipment status?

f) *Personnel Management*: ATFP aims to recognize the importance and effectiveness of the all volunteer force by enabling Soldiers to move between the AC, AR, and the Army National Guard (ARNG) during their careers. How does this impact the AR? In addition, the Soldier for Life aspect of the ATFP enables Army, Government, and community efforts to facilitate successful integration of our Soldiers, alumni, retirees (Veterans) and their families within their communities. How does this benefit the AR? What are the second and third order effects?

g) *Common Standards*: ATFP directs standardized AC and RC qualification and professional development. How does this impact the AR?

h) *Doctrine Development*: The ATFP requires adaptation of current AC and RC training and doctrine publications. How can the AR best influence publication development/revision to ensure commonality while retaining its uniqueness?

#### **D. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)**

##### **1. Army Cyber:**

(POC: William (Bronco) Lane, G-6, [william.e.lane3.civ@mail.mil](mailto:william.e.lane3.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5643)

- a. Who should be in charge of cyber infrastructure and operations in the Army? How do you best structure Army cyber for success?
- b. Should the Signal Center of Excellence and portions of the Military Intelligence Center of Excellence be combined into a Cyber Center of Excellence?
- c. What is the future vision of the Signal/Cyber Corps when considering diminishing resources?
- d. What strategy should be implemented to improve effectiveness of Army cyber by divesting excess resources, harvesting and reshaping those resources, and applying the resources where they can have the highest return on investment within the cyber domain; especially considering diminishing resources. What better business process improvements (i.e., Lean Six Sigma) could be applied to Army cyber?
- e. What roles and functions should FORSCOM perform as the service force provider for conventional forces with respect to cyberspace operations? (How can FORSCOM best facilitate the manning, training, and equipping of conventional forces to be able to operate effectively in the cyber domain?)

##### **2. Future Operational Planning:**

(POC: Barry Lowe, G-3, [barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil](mailto:barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-6334)

- a. Based on lessons learned and open-source intelligence from OEF, OIF, OND, and other operations; has the Army sufficiently manned, trained, and equipped the future force to be able to operate effectively in an future environment?
- b. Is the Army prepared to operate in an environment/theater where the use of a nuclear weapon has blanketed a significant portion of the area of operations with electromagnetic pulse (EMP) causing significant damage to Army mission command systems?

##### **3. Homeland Security:**

(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, [robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil](mailto:robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5082)



- a. What emerging capabilities can enhance mission effectiveness of Army units committed for Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) missions, particularly in terms of communication and relief supply distribution?
- b. In what new ways can Title 10 forces (Active Army and U.S. Army Reserve) provide enhanced capabilities to NORTHCOM during DSCA?
- c. Can traditional campaign planning and theater design improve planning for DSCA?

#### **4. Regional Strategic Issues:**

(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, [robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil](mailto:robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5082)

- a. How can the Army better prepare Soldiers and units for language and cultural knowledge training requirements prior to deployment into Combatant Commanders' areas of responsibility in support of theater security cooperation and joint exercises?
- b. How should the Army prepare Military Intelligence Soldiers to support geographic combatant command (GCC) intelligence requirements, with Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) in mind? What is the best method to ensure effective/efficient utilization of Intelligence Readiness and Operations Capability (IROC) to its full capacity in support of the RAF concept?
- c. What is the optimal balance of Army formations to be assigned to the various combatant commanders versus Army service retained?

#### **5. Special Operations Forces (SOF)-Conventional Forces (CF) Interdependence.**

(POC: Barry Lowe, G-3, [barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil](mailto:barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-6334)

- a. What are the capability shortfalls of SOF that must be met by CF?
- b. What are the capability shortfalls of CF that must be met by SOF?
- c. How is CF support to SOF (and vice versa) identified and resourced—both in pre-deployment and in theater?

#### **6. Military Change in a Resource Constrained Environment.**

(POC: Charles B. O'Brien, G-8, [charles.b.obrien.civ@mail.mil](mailto:charles.b.obrien.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5870)

- a. How can Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution System (PPBES) be made more responsive and agile in reacting to requirements that come out of cycle or result from Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) sync conference results than currently seen with the traditional PPBES timelines for POM, BES, President's Budget, and Appropriations?

- b. What possible better business process and prioritization improvements could be applied to the Army POM build process?
- c. How do we synchronize PPBE, Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), Global Force Management, Security Cooperation planning (including partner nations), and Army Force Generation processes and cycles to ensure the U.S. Army effectively provides and sustains ready Landpower capabilities to the combatant commanders?
- d. Should the U.S. Army develop a new force management and workforce strategy that includes Army civilians as part of base Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) documentation? What is the proper mix of uniformed military and Army civilians within the Army's operating force? How would HR policies need to be modified to reflect greater utilization of Army civilians within the operating force?
- e. Could the Army quantify the costs associated with regenerating BCTs readiness within the ARFORGEN cycle in a timely enough manner as to inform the budget process? Should there be an 'operational offset cost' to be paid by the Combatant Commanders to augment the 'institutional reset' costs incurred through the Army Force Generation process?
- f. How does the U.S. Army reorganize or reallocate roles and responsibilities between the Department (Secretariat and ARSTAF), ACOMs, DRUs, and ASCCs to gain strategic efficiencies?
- g. How does the U.S. Army “operationalize” its institutional and generating force capabilities to build partner capacity within an Army operational lifecycle framework? Would this occur at the cost of the core mission of preparing Army capabilities for employment?
- h. How can military construction (MILCON) processes be changed to enhance congressional involvement and oversight?

## **7. Alignment of Power Projection Platforms.**

(POC: Barry Lowe, G-3, [barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil](mailto:barrett.f.lowe.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-6334)

- a. Does the Army have the required power projection platforms (installations/airfields) to provide rapid deployment of expeditionary capabilities to meet combatant commander requirements?
- b. Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) units aligned under RAF may not be located on/near existing power projection platforms. What is

the impact to readiness and/or meeting combatant commander requirements if platforms don't exist? What alternatives are available to accomplish the rapid deployment of RAF units?

#### **8. National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy:**

(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, [robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil](mailto:robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5082)

- a. Should combat operations be funded through the budget supplemental process? If yes, how can the Army POM process accommodate contingencies and other unforecasted requirements?
- b. How can the Army both increase and improve interagency involvement in combat operations and in the Army's planning and exercise programs?
- c. How do we tailor and prepare Landpower capabilities to best deter rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors?
- d. How can the military better leverage other elements of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) to deter existing and emerging threats?
- e. What are the essential Security Force Assistance (SFA) skills required to support Combatant Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Programs? What changes need to be made to the Army's SFA training to meet the Combatant Commanders requirements?
- f. How does the U.S. Army best leverage other U.S. Government departments and agencies' funds for security cooperation/assistance to train its formations and Soldiers?

#### **9. Readiness and Deployability:**

(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, [robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil](mailto:robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5082)

- a. What improvements can be made to increase the deployability of service members, improve transparency to Commanders, and address the issue of deployability in relation to readiness?

#### **10. Joint and Service Training.**

(POC: Robert Johnson, CIG, [robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil](mailto:robert.l.johnson563.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5082)

- a. What is the gap between where Service METL ends and Joint METL begins? Does our current joint training framework provide a ready joint force for the Combatant Commanders to receive and organize in time of crisis? If the current framework does not, what are ways to improve the framework?

- b. Specifically for Joint Task Force-Headquarters (JTF-HQ) capable formations, how much of their training under their Service must be aimed at JTF-HQ readiness, and how is this joint business to be conducted from a resourcing and standards perspective?

#### **11. Single Reserve Component.**

(POC: William (Bronco) Lane, G-6, [william.e.lane3.civ@mail.mil](mailto:william.e.lane3.civ@mail.mil), 910-570-5643)

- a. What are the implications of reorganizing all Reserve Component into a single component?
- b. What are the legal requirements and resource implications impacted by a reorganization of the Reserve Component into a single component?
- c. How could the Reserve Component be reshaped to yield the biggest return on investment?

### **4. Other Organizations**

#### **A. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)**

Sponsor: Major General MG Harold Greene

(POC: Professor Louis Yuengert, USAWC, [Louis.g.yuengert.civ@mail.mil](mailto:Louis.g.yuengert.civ@mail.mil), 717-245-4790)

1) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) drove innovation and change in so many ways. As we return to the United States, what will provide the demand signal for innovation and change?

2) What does an active rapid acquisition process look like? The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) ought to be part of a continuum which includes REF activities, regionally aligned forces, the activities of Battle labs and research laboratories, as well as industry. Recommend a campaign plan for experimentation that weaves all of these activities together.

3) How do we implement reversibility and expandability with respect to modernization and equipping?

#### **B. Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation**

Sponsor: Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert Lennox

(POC: Professor Louis Yuengert, USAWC, [Louis.g.yuengert.civ@mail.mil](mailto:Louis.g.yuengert.civ@mail.mil), 717-245-4790)

- 1) How should Army airlift requirements be determined?
- 2) What is the strategic purpose, including strategic mobility implications, of Army Pre-Positioned Stocks given the change in U.S. strategy toward the Pacific?
- 3) How does the Army explain operations tempo (OPTEMPO) dollars and the strategic impact of cuts in funding for OPTEMPO?
- 4) With regards to depot maintenance, what must the throughput be to justify depot infrastructure? What are the appropriate metrics to measure depot performance and efficiency? “Justify” implies that we may be justifying closing depots based on lack of throughput.

### C. Center for Army Analysis

(POC: Mr. H. J. Orgeron, [herman.j.orgeron.civ@mail.mil](mailto:herman.j.orgeron.civ@mail.mil), 703-806-532 )

1) *Strategic and Campaign Assessment Doctrine*. After a decade of war, the international community and the Department of Defense (DoD) have developed a significant reliance on qualitative and quantitative reports and information from major theater commands (such as the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan) and strategic-level headquarters. Much of the work done to provide this information comes from operations assessment organizations. Assessment doctrine, techniques, organizations, and processes have changed much during this time of conflict. In recent years, the various defense communities have strived to capture the “lessons learned” from assessments work—especially in the complex areas involving strategy and campaigns. The focus of this project would include the following: (1) identify and capture the current status of assessment techniques and procedures at the combatant command/theater campaign level; (2) extract the ones that provide useful insights and applications to the overall community; (3) incorporate these insights into an unclassified report for use by allied assessment communities, the DoD, and/or the Army; and (4) publish an article describing the possible interactions between assessment and planning (to include general ideas, concepts, techniques and processes). NOTE: This project can be scoped to an area of interest fitting a student project—the primary idea is to improve doctrine and organizations at the strategic or campaign level.

2) *Dissolution of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research) and Its Impacts on the Army*. On April 6, 2006, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army disestablished the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research), also known by the acronym DUSA(OR). The various tasks assigned to that office (along with the associated personnel) were redistributed to several organizations and staff elements within the Army. Since that time, the Army employs quantitative analysis in support of specific efforts in a decentralized manner. In recent years, this decentralized situation has come under scrutiny by some of the

Army's senior leaders. The focus of this project centers on (1) determining where the functions and personnel of the DUSA(OR) went; (2) assessing whether Headquarters, Department of the Army benefited or not from the changes, (3) and analyzing how well the Army's quantitative analysis capabilities support the Army's senior leaders at the Army/strategic level.

3) *Assessing the Stryker Brigade*. Under the term of General Eric Shinseki, the Army developed, organized, fielded, trained, and deployed a new brigade. Originally intended to provide an interim solution to a strategic challenge, the Stryker endures to this day as a permanent part of the Army's combat capabilities. The goal of the project is to highlight how the Army executed such a new concept in a short period of time and analyze how well the original concept has survived the test of time. Recommendations on how the Army can leverage this experience to change its policies and Army-wide processes are well within the scope of the project.

4) *Campaign Battle-Space Ownership – Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces (SOF/GPF)*. There are myriad anecdotes about C2 challenges in Phase IV/V Operations, especially where SOF and GPF "run into each other" while they are trying to accomplish their missions in the same battle-space. In recent operational experiences, the boundaries of SOF and GPF do not coincide, and liaison/communications linkages do not always take place. This leads to GPF tactical/operational commanders (who own the battle-space) having operational SOF forces in their area. These forces may answer to multiple GPF commands as well as the SOF chain of command. The goal of this project centers on determining where SOF and GPF truly come together, based on recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Furthermore, the project should identify any ongoing solutions or processes that address the challenge. Given a systemic challenge in battle-space ownership and coordination, the project can suggest ways for future campaign commanders to relieve this conflict and improve C2 in these operations.

5) *NATO Planning and Training Scenarios*. The DoD employs a scenario-based approach in identifying and/or describing its strategic and campaign systems uses and requirements. These scenarios serve many purposes—planning, war gaming, training, and others. These scenarios provide a common context and framework to the Services and organizations of the DoD, and promote coordination among the Services and organizations of DoD. Furthermore, the common frame of reference for training and planning purposes greatly assists in understanding unity of effort, individual element capabilities and limitations, and other areas. Given the increased emphasis on international cooperation and understanding, scenario projects and products that can be used for international exercises could prove very helpful in understanding coalition warfare. NATO, in particular, has been active in international level campaigns. This project would assess the current status of scenario usage in an international forum (and/or within NATO), identify if there is a desire or need for constructing scenarios in



promoting NATO's goals, and describe what such a process, if needed, would look like. NOTE: This effort could be modified to discuss international scenario challenges outside of a NATO context but within an international framework.

6) *Adaptable forces vs. Specialized Forces.* DoD employs a force planning construct to accomplish a set of future requirements. To do so, it characterizes a collection of scenarios and quantifies the forces required to meet those scenarios. The services, in turn, identify a collection of forces to meet those requirements as closely as possible. This process serves as the foundation for the services' structures. However, those theoretical futures never occur. The Army in particular finds itself meeting requirements for which it was not designed. To mitigate the differences between future requirements and eventual real requirements, the Army's units "adapt" to accomplish secondary missions (typically via augmentation, additional equipment, and additional training). The goal of this project would address the issue of building Army force structure that can address a wide range of challenges while maintaining core capabilities. Can the Army characterize factors that make some units more "adaptable" than others? Can the Army structure itself so as to maximize adaptability for a broad range of possible futures?

7) *Military Integration with Other Government Agencies (OGA) in the Counterdrug Fight.* The U.S. military has three task forces dedicated to counterdrug operations on or near our southern border: JTF-North, CJTF-West, and CJTF-South. The mission is run by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the use of military forces is complicated by laws regarding the use of Federal forces in the continental United States (CONUS). There appears to be a challenge of unity of command, military policy, and U.S. law that impedes the military's ability to contribute to the counterdrug fight. This project would review the literature, history, and current status of these counterdrug operations, provide an assessment of their effectiveness in using military assets, and highlight possible alternatives/options on ways to improve the use of the military (to possibly include maintenance of status quo or termination of military usage).

#### **D. U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Centers (ECBC)**

(POC: Dr. Augustus W. Fountain III, Senior Research Scientist (ST), [augustus.w.fountain.civ@mail.mil](mailto:augustus.w.fountain.civ@mail.mil), 443-722-5724)

Examine the strategic implications of the use of weaponized incapacitants, pharmaceuticals, and bio-regulating drugs for internal law enforcement, counterterrorism, and military operations.

Background: The Third Review Conference of the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) met in April 2013 without being able to adopt language addressing the use of "incapacitants." The use of a fentanyl cocktail by Russian special forces in October 2002 to end a hostage crisis in the Dubrovka Theater by Chechen

extremists brought their use into the international spotlight. Despite the deaths of 125 hostages, there was no public outcry on the use of a knock down agent to resolve the crisis. In December 2011, the European Court of Human Rights found the Russian government not-guilty regarding the use of the fentanyl cocktail; citing that the intended use of the incapacitant was law enforcement purposes. This ambiguity in the CWC is bearing witness to a surge of research and development into fentanyls and other pharmaceuticals by CWC signatory countries. While these chemicals are deemed incapacitants, under certain concentrations and conditions they can be lethal, as evidenced by the deaths at the Russian opera house. The dual use of these and other pharmaceuticals makes monitoring proliferation activities difficult. With this trend, there is reason for concern that the United States and its allies could experience these chemicals in future combat actions.



## USAWC KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST 2013-2014

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**KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST**

**PART III:  
JOINT SUPPLEMENT**

**August 27, 2013**

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### JOINT SUPPLEMENT

#### 1. U.S. Air Force

[Air Force and Air War College: Service Oriented Topic List](#). The list is managed by the Air University Research Information management System (AURIMS). Topics have been submitted by the following: CSAF-SECAF, Air War College, Air Force Global Strike, Air Force Special Operations, Air Mobility Command, Air Combat Command, Air University, Air Education and Training Command, and HQAF Staff: A1, A3, A4, A5, A7, A8, and A10.

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#### 2. U.S. Navy

The United States Naval War College, Joint Military Operations (JMO) Department: [JMO Research Paper Topics](#), January 15, 2013. Various commands, organizations, and agencies have provided issues of contemporary concern.

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#### 3. U.S. Marine Corps

[Marine Corps University Research Topic Nominations](#). Topics have been submitted for Annual Year 2013-14 and are organized by major combat functions: Command & Control, Maneuver, Fires, Intel, Logistics, Force Protection, and Cyber.

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